So many young Australian men enlisted in July 1915! To be exact, 36 575 of them did. There were good reasons for this. The landing at Gallipoli had occurred eight weeks earlier and the newspapers were full of stories of heroic deeds. Enlistments were averaging about 8 000 a month for the first four months of 1915. Gallipoli changed that. After the first landing on 25 April 1915, the realization that the war was going badly (10 000 Australian casualties had been reported by the end of June) and the sinking earlier that month of the British liner *Lusitania* off the southern coast of Ireland, with 1 200 drowned, led to a sharp increase in the numbers of men signing up in Australia. An energetic recruiting campaign launched just after the landing at Anzac Cove also encouraged the rush to enlist. So did a relaxation of the initially very strict physical requirements, originally set down in August the previous year when the recruiting offices were beleaguered by thousands of young men (the so-called 'Dinkum Aussies') keen to be a part of what was promised to be a short and sharp conflict.

1915 Recruitment Poster
(AWM U5167)

One of the many who responded in July 1915 was twenty-six year-old William Dawe, a groom from Dandenong Road, Malvern. He could have

signed up at the beginning of the conflict in August the previous year. He was tall enough at five feet six inches (168 centimetres) to meet the minimum requirements, and his chest expansion, at thirty-four inches (eighty-six centimetres) was also acceptable. However, he only weighed nine stone (fifty-seven kilograms) so he was quite slight. We can speculate about the reasons why William chose not to enlist along with the thousands who besieged the recruiting centres in 1914. Perhaps he thought he was too small and weak. Perhaps he considered that, at twenty-six, he was a little too old to join the enthusiastic throngs of young men in what was expected to be a very short conflict ('The war will be over by Christmas' was the common belief at the time). Perhaps he had other things to do first. However, whatever concerns he may have had were put aside in July the following year as he signed his name on the attestation form and was given the serial number 1400. It may also be the case that, along with many other apparently eligible men, he received one or more white feathers in the mail from anonymous females. The feathers were traditionally signs of cowardice and were used to goad apparently reluctant men into action. Unfortunately, they were often sent indiscriminately, including to men back from the war, suffering some injury or illness that could not readily be seen.

William was youngest of three children born to William Dawe Senior and his wife, Mary Ann. He came into the world on 28 February 1889, being born at Auburn in Victoria. He grew up in the family home at Malvern, along with his older sisters Annie and Ethel.

Mary Ann with Annie and Ethel outside the family home
(Sally Dunn/Michael Dawe)

William (centre) along with
Annie and Ethel
(Sally Dunn/Michael Dawe)

As a groom, William was used to handling horses, so it was natural that he would join the Australian Light Horse. He was assigned to 11 Reinforcements, 8 Light Horse Regiment - a unit of 3 Light Horse Brigade - and completed his training at Broadmeadows Army Camp and possibly the new one at Seymour as well.



8 Light Horse Regiment shoulder patch
(http://www.commons.wikipedia.org)

In training at Broadmeadows or Seymour. William is on the far left. Note the pet rabbit on his shoulder. (Sally Dunn/Michael Dawe)

The Australian Light Horse had been formed in 1902, evolving out of the mounted rifle units that operated in South Africa during the Boer War (1899-1902). Its brigades went to Gallipoli, horses and all, in early 1915. However, the terrain there was far too rugged for cavalry-type actions, and the men were asked to act as infantry for the duration of the campaign.

Enlisting in the Light Horse after the landing at Gallipoli, William was one of the so-called 'Fair Dinkums' – men who displayed guts and determination despite the gloomy news leaking out from the peninsula. As Glenn McFarlane puts it:

> They are called 'The Fair Dinkums', for it was said that you had to be fair dinkum to enlist after it became clear what a mess the Gallipoli campaign had become. Reports of a successful operation had been exaggerated from the outset, so the extent of the mess – the botched landings, the chaos of that first day – was not yet fully apparent to Australians at home. In its place was guesswork, propaganda or newspaper eulogies about the triumph of cold steel, courage and creativity against the Turks.
>
> The reality was very different . . .[1]

As time went on, and the numbers of women wearing black in the streets increased, fewer and fewer men were prepared to sign on. By November 1915, the monthly number was down to 11 230, less than one-third of the July maximum. By that time, however, William and his Light Horse compatriots in 11 Reinforcements were on their way to Egypt, having sailed from Port Melbourne on A6 HMAT *Clan MacCorquodale* on the thirteenth of the month.

HMAT *Clan MacCorquodale* at anchor. It was torpedoed and sunk In the Mediterranean in November 1917. (AWM P01122.003)

After travelling through the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, the ship arrived at the port of Alexandria and the men were then transported to Heliopolis, an ancient city on the north-eastern edge of Cairo. They were there by the middle of December.

(en.wikipedia.org)



Thursday Dec 9th 1915

No 1400
11th Reinforcements
5th Regiment
3rd L. Horse Brigade
A. J. F
Abroad.

Give my love to Mother xxx tell her not to worry as her boy is living well xxx

Dear Annie,

Just a line to let you know that I am doing extra well & having a fine trip. Will send you a present from whatever place we go to. The weather is very warm at present. Well Annie I must now conclude Hoping that this finds you in the best of health as it leaves me at present.

I remain
your Loving Brother
Willie xxxxxxxx

I have no short note, nothing to write about. xxx

By this time, the men would probably have heard that the troops were being evacuated from Gallipoli, the final numbers leaving on 19 December. The Australian military authorities were just beginning to reorganise their forces. New arrivals of 'Fair Dinkums' since November had almost doubled the numbers of Australian personnel, and new battalions and other units were being created. 8 Light Horse Regiment (LHR) had been decimated in the disastrous diversionary attacks at the Nek the previous August. Members of the regiment, being used as

infantry in the rough terrain, had gone over the top in the first wave, led by their commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander White. After the second, equally disastrous wave of more 8 LHR men, White and twenty-one other men were reported killed, and seventy-six wounded. However, 127 members of the regiment were reported missing. Their bodies, some of them wounded, lay in the narrow gap ('No Man's Land') between the Turkish and Australian trenches. 8 LHR suffered a total of 234 casualties, 154 of them fatal. 10 LHR (from Western Australia, and the subject of Peter Weir's film *Gallipoli*), involved in the next two waves, suffered 138 casualties, eighty of them fatal. By the fourth and final wave, many of the men left their rifles behind and simply charged with their bayonets. They had seen what had happened to most of those who went before, and they knew that their chances of reaching the Turkish trenches and surviving were infinitesimal.

The bodies of those killed remained in No Man's Land until the end of the war in 1918, such was the danger involved in attempting to retrieve them and the wounded in front of the Turkish machine guns. By 1918, only their bleached bones were left.

Lambert, George: *The charge of the Third Light Horse Brigade at the Nek, 7 August 1915* (AWM ART 07965)

With the new arrivals, including William, 8 LHR was back up to strength again by 7 January 1916, containing 699 personnel. The situation in Egypt was fluid at this time. Now that the Gallipoli campaign was over, the Turkish forces there were free to join their compatriots in the Sinai Desert and march on the Suez Canal. In early 1915, soon after entering the war on the side of Germany and Austria-Hungary, Turkey had

ordered its forces in Palestine (the area had been occupied by Turkey since 1299) to advance into the Sinai Peninsula and move on the important transport route. They reached as far as the east bank of the waterway in February 1915 and attempted to cross it. Three boatloads of Turkish troops did actually reach the other side but were quickly repulsed. The cost to the Turks was high: 2 000 killed or wounded and 700 captured. The British forces lost twenty-nine killed and 130 wounded.



Captured Turkish pontoons at Ismailia, on the Suez Canal
(William Dawe)

As Barry Stone puts it:

> It had not been Britain's intention in early 1915 to occupy any of the 60, 000 square kilometres of the Sinai Peninsula, but the thought of the [Suez Canal] becoming a no-man's-land separating Briton from Turk and blasted to bits in the process was unacceptable, and so a defensive line was established east of it in the Sinai . . . a line it was hoped would be enough to deter Turkish aggression. The canal not only had to be defended, it had to be protected. It was too precious to risk being turned into a defensive hole in the ground.[2]

And so, after the failure at Gallipoli, a Plan B was formed by the Allies: strike east of the canal, moving through Sinai and north into Palestine, mopping up the Turkish forces and seizing their headquarters in Damascus. 'By doing this,' comments Stone, 'the whole wretched [Turkish] empire, instead of being smashed in the head, might just be cut off at its ankles.'[3] This plan fitted in well with, and was probably

inspired by, the writings of British intelligence officer, Second-Lieutenant T.E. Lawrence, based in Cairo. His plan was to equip and lead the Bedouin tribes of Arabia in cutting the Turkish railway line that ran from Damascus and Beirut, through Jordan to the Gulf of Aqaba, which adjoins the Red Sea. The line was used to transport soldiers, arms, supplies and goods, and the Bedouins hated it because it had reduced the tolls and way-leaves they demanded from travellers using the traditional desert tracks. Roland Perry places this proposed action in the wider context by writing that

> Lawrence was aware that his suggestion and scheme for a revolt by the tribes of Arabia would not be viewed by his superiors as a major campaign. It would be the first important step in curtailing and disturbing Turkish control in the region. Driving them from Sinai, Palestine, Arabia and Syria altogether would need a full-scale military operation.[4]

(www.bing.com)

This was where the Australian Light Horse came in. While it was decided that some of the units would be sent to the Western Front in France and Belgium (and many of the Light Horsemen volunteered for this move), others became the Anzac Mounted Division, comprising three LH brigades and the New Zealand Brigade, under the command of Major-General Harry Chauvel. They joined the British in the so-called Mediterranean (or Egyptian) Expeditionary Force, commanded by British Lieutenant-General Sir Archibald Murray. The British orders to Murray

were to hold the defensive line east of the canal. However, according to official war historian Charles Bean, the orders were imprecise and Murray

> . . . was convinced that . . . the only plan which could make the [Nile] Delta absolutely safe was to advance a force across Sinai to the plains of southern Palestine . . . [W]ithin a few weeks of his arrival [he] had resolved to advance beyond his entrenched line and deny the Peninsula to the enemy.[5]

Taking advantage of a desperate order from British minister of war Lord Kitchener in April after the disastrous defeat of an 8 000-strong British-Indian force by the Turks at Kut (in modern-day Iraq) saying that ' . . . any success you can achieve during the next few days will be most valuable'[6], Murray seized the opportunity and ordered his forces forward into Sinai.

But that did not happen until April 1916. What was William doing up until that time? The official record, mentioned above, listed 11 Reinforcements as being at Heliopolis on Boxing Day. It is probably the case, however, that the men disembarked at Port Said on the canal before that date and were in Heliopolis by the middle of December.

Tents and horses of 8 LHR, Heliopolis 1915 (AWM H03098)

Evidence for this belief exists in the photo below, showing a group of men at the Pyramids at Giza, on the edge of Cairo. On the back of the

photo, William lists himself as being third from the left and confirms the date of the photo (as listed in the bottom left-hand corner) as 15 December 1915. He even tells us that the guide (reclining in front of the camels) was named Abraham and that the man second from the right was a sergeant from Mordialloc – 'a real character.' He indicates that the day was very hot and that the sun was in the men's eyes as the photo was taken.



(Sally Dunn/Michael Dawe)

A photo from the Australian War Memorial, also taken in 1915, shows a number of men from B squadron, 8 LHR, standing on the very top of one pyramid. When comparing the two photos, one can note that the men on the pyramid have emu feathers in their hats, whereas William and his group, bar one, have ordinary felt caps. This may mean that the men in the second photo are Gallipoli veterans, perhaps survivors of the Nek, while William and his group are recent arrivals.

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL H03071

On 25 January, while still based At Heliopolis, William developed mumps, of all things, and was transported to Number 4 Auxiliary Hospital in nearby Abbassia.

No. 4 Auxiliary Hospital (http://www.auspostalhistory.com)

Actually, mumps was quite prevalent amongst the troops at that time. McFarlane tells us that several men from a group of 'Fair Dinkums' who arrived in Egypt in October 1915 contracted mumps, and quotes a 7 Battalion man named Raymond Rohner as writing that the disease may have been 'brought by transport from camps in Australia.'[7]

William eventually recovered and returned to 8 LHR on 11 February. It was still located at Heliopolis, but groups of men were designated to move to Serapeum, on the canal, to take up defensive positions there. On 24 February, just as ninety-six men from the newly arrived 13 Reinforcements marched in, William was unaccountably transferred temporarily to 3 LH Brigade headquarters. No reason for the move is given in his military record, and no return date is listed either. However, because 8LHR was part of 3 Brigade, we must assume that, as the units moved eastwards, William went with them. Fortunately for us, he took a camera with him.

A pontoon bridge across the Suez Canal at Serapeum, early 1916 (AWM A02439)

599 men of 8 LHR arrived at Serapeum between 26 and 28 February. William's record indicates that he was one of them. This was the beginning of a prolonged stay in the desert for the Light Horse. Peter Stanley[8] comments that no other Australians saw such unremitting service, in this or any other war. By 21 March, some of the troops were being sent out on patrol towards the east, and others moved to outpost duties at the front, east of the canal. On 4 April, the regiment moved to a short distance to the railhead at Ferry Post, near Ismailia. The men stayed at Ferry Post until the end of July, the various squadrons rotating to and from the defensive positions at the front line. On the last two days of that month, the troopers were finally ordered forward and moved to the area near Aras and Simara, in the northern part of the Sinai. The dryness and lack of resources in the region are evidenced by the fact that B squadron had to go out into the desert and dig wells after they had arrived. As Paul Daley puts it, 'Water was the key to success in the Sinai.'[9]



(http://www.suezcanalzone.com)

(en.wikipedia.org)

Things had been happening in the Sinai and Mesopotamia (modern-day Iraq) while William and his comrades were at Ferry Post. In late April, as mentioned above, the Turks had claimed Kut from a British-Indian force after a siege lasting almost five months. Perry tells us that, after that victory,

> . . . the Turks then began their push towards the Suez Canal via the northern route over Sinai closest to the Mediterranean. They . . . defeated the under-prepared and under-resourced British 5th Mounted (Yeomanry) Brigade at the posts of Katia and Oghratina 40 kilometres east of the canal into the Sinai, where they were massacred.[10]

After being captured, 250 of the British survivors were slain by Bedouin Arabs, who had been left to guard them overnight. When 2 LH Brigade

arrived to provide support, they discovered many bodies. As Perry puts it, 'Corpses in their hundreds were left where they had been slain by the Arabs . . .'[11]

There were a number of massacres in the Middle East during the war, perhaps the most infamous being the slaughter of thousands of Armenians by the Turks. Just what this picture, presumably taken by William, shows us is unclear. It may be men (including Arabs) burying those slain at Katia a few months after the event. Note the soldiers in the centre background, who appear to be bringing in a corpse found some distance from the main group. Note also that two of the bodies have no boots. The Bedouin were renown for stripping the bodies of the slain, including taking their boots.

(William Dawe)

The slaughter at Katia/Oghratina had a profound effect on the Australians. As Perry comments:

> The Australian Light Horse, who came across the results of the butchery were sickened and sobered by what they saw. No matter how long this war in the desert continued they would never trust the Bedouins again, regardless of directives from the British command about how to deal with local Arabs . . . all Arabs would be treated with suspicion.[12]

3 LH Brigade moved on to the main town in the area, Romani. However, the Turks and the Bedouins had withdrawn further east, and the settlement was taken without opposition. Nevertheless, the Turks would

be back. Romani was important as the centre of an extensive system of oases.

The pattern of the conflict had now been established. The battles to come would now be largely fought along a narrow coastal plain that had been used by armies for nearly two thousand years. Barry Stone notes that it was

> . . . an ancient caravan route from Palestine to Egypt, which started in the Syrian capital of Damascus, went south to Jerusalem, then down to Rafa and through the deserts of northern Sinai all the way to Kantara [El Qantara] on the [Suez] canal itself. More a well-worn track than a road, its path was determined not by engineers but by the location of the Sinai's precious wells, and passed over all the scattered bones of the armies that had come before, from the Phoenicians to Napoleon.[13]

On 4 August, 8 LHR, along with the rest of 3 LH Brigade, moved east to the oasis of Dueidar, about twenty-one kilometres south-west of Katia. It was flanking the other LH units that had gone before it, assisting in holding watering holes captured from the enemy.

Unknown soldier with equipment
(worldcat.org)

On 5 August 8 LHR, which had been in reserve south of the battlefield, moved north towards the oasis of Bir el Hamisah and came into contact with Turkish forces at 2.00 pm. Heavy fighting was occurring in the vicinity of Katia, and 9 and 10 LH Regiments drove the Turks back in the direction of Bir el Hamisah, where 422 of them were captured.



Dispositions during the Battle of Katia (Gullett, H.S.: *The Australian Imperial Force in Sinai and Palestine 1914-1918 (*Bean: *Official history*, vol.VII)

As the Australian War Memorial notes[14], these conflicts were part of the encompassing Battle of Romani, fought between 3 and 5 August 1916. The battle finally put a stop to the Turkish threat to the Suez Canal and marked the beginning of the British forces' drive out of Egypt and into Palestine. The memorial's summary also notes that, after Turkish resistance finally collapsed on 5 August, 'large numbers of prisoners were taken. At 6.30 am fresh troops of the 3rd Light Brigade were **turned loose** in pursuit of the retreating Turks.' (my emphasis) 8 LHR's involvement in this pursuit came on 7 August, when it took over the lead from 10 LHR and pushed forward, taking Hod el Sagia and Hod el Bada. However, it was then held up for the remainder of the day by deeply entrenched Turks and eventually retreated to a nearby oasis to deny the Turks the use of its water. 9 LHR then took over and consolidated the position.



A Light Horseman with his mount. (www.bing.com)

'A' Squadron, 8 LHR, camped near Romani, August 1916 AWM H13693)

When the Turks finally abandoned Katia on 6 August (3 LH Brigade having a big victory south of that settlement on the fifth, when a strongpoint was rushed at 1.00 pm, resulting in the capture of 425 enemy and seven machine guns), the threat to Romani was over. However, the cost to the Anzac Mounted Division was considerable: 900 (including 202 killed) of the 1 130 allied casualties. The Turks lost an estimated 9 000: 1 250 dead were buried by the victors.[15]

Turkish soldiers captured at Romani. The first attack in this battle was made in the area in the background. (AWM J01074)

Lambert, George: *Battle of Romani, 4 August 1916*
(ART09556 Copyright © Australian War Memorial)

Kathrine Bell writes that, while the Turks had been pushed back,

> . . . the defeat was not as final as the Australians would have liked. It dispersed the enemy but left him able to regroup and attack again, which he did at Katia and Bir el Abd. Because they could not get to the much needed water, the Light Horse were forced to return to Romani under the orders of . . . Chauvel who was in command. But the Turks were in retreat and heading towards El Arish, close to the Palestine border.[16]

The Light Horse now set out in pursuit of the Turks. 8 LHR occupied Hamisah on the sixth and discovered one wounded Turk there. Late in the afternoon it moved on, heading towards Hod el Sagia. When it arrived there the next day, it discovered that the Turks were deeply dug in and rifle, machine gun and artillery fire ensued. Late in the evening, the regiment was relieved by 9 LHR. 8 LHR had suffered three dead and six wounded in the exchange. One of the men killed was Lieutenant R.W. Urquhart. Along with the other dead men, he was buried in the sand at the oasis and his grave was photographed.

(AWM H13617)

The headquarters of 3 LH Brigade at Hod el Sagia. Note the camels. Some Light Horsemen became 'cameliers' during the conflict (AWM J02665B)

Despite Bell's comment above about the Turks retreating towards El Arish, let us not think that they simply abandoned their forward posts and left them to the Allies. Progress during August was slow and costly because of the opposition put up by the enemy. At Hod el Bada on the ninth, fierce resistance in the form of rifle and machine gun fire, plus shrapnel shells, was presented and 8 LHR suffered substantial casualties. The Turks even staged a counter-attack late in the day. However, as the 8 LHR commander reported,

> **. . . a sharp attack was made by the enemy, advancing in main against our left centre. They were apparently short of ammunition and too much exhausted to advance up the steep slope to our position and the attack died away as darkness came.[17]**

By the end of the day, eight men had been killed and thirty-six wounded. Five of the latter group subsequently died of their wounds. Fortunately, William remained uninjured.

On 11 August, while attempting to flank the Turks, the regiment moved towards Hassaniya. As they did so, another form of enemy weaponry came into force: aerial attack. An aeroplane dropped two bombs on the

men just outside the oasis and soon afterwards brought down an allied aircraft. Since the beginning of the war two years before, aeronautical

engineering and tactics had advanced rapidly. Dropping bombs from aircraft was now established practice and machine guns had replaced pistols as the main means of firing upon enemies both in the air and on the ground.



A British Martinside bomber with two one hundred-pound bombs
(William Dawe)

1 ALH Regiment after being bombed in the desert
(William Dawe)

The significance of the Battle of Romani cannot be overestimated. Barry Stone writes that it settled any pretensions the Turks had regarding Egypt and any credible threat they might pose to the Suez Canal.

> It was the first real victory of the Allied war effort after a string of losses in France and at Kut. And it was at Romani that our Light Horsemen first began to realise just what their horses were capable of – travelling every day through sand so deep it reached up to their fetlocks, carrying up to 100 kg on their backs and enduring days without water – and all this at the height of a Sinai summer![18]

'Just going out for a ride. A very pretty place isn't it?'
(William Dawe)

The 'Walers', as they were called, were specially bred, hardy, desert horses that could survive on short rations and no water over periods of up

to seventy hours. These qualities became very important indeed in the lead up to the charge at Beersheba in October 1917.

After the Battle of Romani, General Murray divided his mounted forces (The Desert Column') into two groups: the Anzac Mounted Division and the Imperial (later 'Australian') Mounted Division. Along with 4 LH Brigade, 3 LH Brigade was allocated to the latter group. The task for both groups, however, was still the same: pursue the Turks out of Sinai and into southern Palestine. Between August and December, they moved forward, towards the oasis of El Arish, close to the Palestine border. They would be happy to leave the Sinai. It was a bleak place. Note the obvious cynicism in William's comment above! The weather routinely went from blisteringly hot during the day to, in the words of T. E, Lawrence, 'a winter cold with the unbridled cold of a country over which the wind can rage in unchecked fury.'[19] Stone comments that it was a shockingly empty place, with few towns of any meaningful size, no roads and few crops.[20] The need for water was constant. One 3 LH Brigade man commented later:

> I can honestly say that, except on special occasions, I was thirsty for the whole nine months we were crossing the Sinai.[21]

Water pipes (and roads) were being laid across the desert in the wake of the allied advance from Kantara on the canal towards the oasis of Mazar, close to the border with Palestine. However, they could not keep up with the progress of the forces at the front, so the Light Horsemen and other groups did not benefit from them.

By 17 September, after a period in reserve and after being attacked by an enemy aeroplane (but suffering no casualties), 8 LHR was involved in an assault on Mazar, which was heavily defended by the Turks. The allied force was relying on the arrival of the camel corps to give it the strength to push the attack home. However, the cameliers did not make it! As a result, the attack was abandoned and the regiment was withdrawn from the firing line.

8 LHR remained in reserve into the month of October 1916. On the twelfth, William was transferred to the brigade's training regiment, back at Moascar, on the canal. Given what happened in consequence, it is safe to assume that he was selected, or volunteered, to train as a machine gunner.

A 3 LH Brigade column returning to base after the aborted attack on Mazar, 17 September 1916 (AWM J02620)

Bean tells us that, in late 1916 - early 1917, as more arms became available from England, a change was made in the machine gun allocation to the Light Horse regiments. When they left Australia, each regiment was equipped with two machine guns. In July 1916 those machine guns were removed and each brigade was given a squadron made up of eight officers and 221 other ranks and twelve Maxim guns. These were replaced later by Vickers guns. At the same time, each regiment was equipped with three Lewis light machine guns, later replaced by Hotchkiss weapons. These changes

> . . . greatly increased the effectiveness of the brigades; the regiments were made stronger in themselves, and the machine-gun squadrons proved invaluable in many fights, giving covering fire to the advancing line in dismounted attacks. The machine-guns were carried into action on pack-horses, and were frequently used as advance-guards on the flanks. Their teams became so expert that the guns frequently opened fire less than one minute after the men got the order to halt their galloping horses; and the rapidity with which they moved from position to position had a disconcerting effect upon the enemy. [22]

The Maxim machine gun (www.historywarsweapons.com)

The Vickers machine gun (www.yorkmuseumstrust.org.uk)

William's record indicates that he was at Moascar until 9 March 1917. We know that he visited several sites in Egypt because he took photographs at many spots. It seems quite reasonable to believe that he made many of those visits while he spent four months on the canal. An extract from his pay book gives an indication of the 'large sums' he had available to spend (a private's/trooper's salary was six shillings a day).



Cash payments made to D'WE .W.

Date.	Place.	Amount.	Signature of Officer.
	Bel. Ford	7 £ 6-4	
27.4.16	Serapeum	1. 10.10	E Berkeley Ayres Capt
11.5.16	—do—	1-0-6	E Berkeley Ayres Capt
25.5.16	—do— 10.18.2	1-0-6	E Berkeley Ayres Capt
UN 5. 1916	- do -	1-0-6	W S Kent Hughes Capt
22.6.16	- do -	10 3	W S Kent Hughes Capt
6.7.16	- do -	2 1.1	W S Kent Hughes Capt
20.7.16	- do -	1-0-6	W S Kent Hughes Capt

Note the last four entries, signed by Captain Wilfrid S. Kent Hughes. This man went on to be a lieutenant-colonel in the Second World War. He was captured by the Japanese in Singapore in February 1942 and spent time in Changi prison camp before being transported to Formosa (Taiwan) and later to Manchuria. After the war, he became a politician, serving as a minister in the Menzies Liberal-Country Party government. He was knighted for his services to the nation.

Below is a selection of the photographs William left behind for us to see.

Probably in the streets of Cairo. William has marked himself with a cross

Captured Turkish artillery pieces on display

Note the double exposure, showing Egyptian architecture and statuary



Pyramids at Sakhara

Luxor

Nhouza Gardens, Alexandria

When William finished his training, he was transferred to the newly created 4 LH Brigade Machine Gun Squadron which, at that time, was at Ferry Post. From there, the brigade moved east on 20 March, reaching Romani on the twenty-third. By the last day of the month it was at Rabah. El Arish was reached by 6 April. This ancient village of mud brick houses, twenty-four kilometres from the border with Palestine, had already been evacuated by the Turks when taken by the British forces on 20 December.



4 LH Brigade Machine Gun Squadron Colour Patch
(www.alh-research.tripod.com)

Lambert George: *El Arish* (AWM ART02677 Copyright © Australian War Memorial)

Bell[23] writes that the Light Horse were happy to be in El Arish because the hardships of the Sinai, with its hot winds, sandstorms and countless flies, were over. Bean[24] also notes that the long campaign in the peninsula was accompanied by various forms of minor sickness, each peculiar to certain locations. As an example, in July-August 1916, during the Battle of Romani, many men

> . . . suffered from what, in characteristic Australian language, they

> called the "Barcoo Spew." Men apparently in sound health would suddenly be overcome with nausea and be very ill for perhaps half-an-hour, after which they would completely recover.

Late in December, the allied forces fought spirited battles at Madghaba, south-east of El Arish, and then Rafa, just over the border. The Battle of Rafa (9 January 1917) marked the last major battle of the Sinai campaign. Although these settlements were well and truly in allied hands by the time 4 LH Brigade arrived at the latter one on 11 April, its journey had not been scot-free. In the vicinity of Mazar on the fourth of the month, for example, the column had been machine-gunned by an enemy aeroplane. Fortunately, there were no casualties. The Turks were still putting up fierce resistance as they fell back.

Kilo 143, scene of the Turks' last stand at Rafa
(William Dawe)

The column moved to Khan Yunus (in southern Gaza) on the eleventh. Bell implies that the terrain of Palestine (or 'the Holy Land', as William describes it) was far more amenable to the men and their animals, writing that

> The landscape . . . was in many ways similar to Australia and the [troopers] felt much more at home and the horses were glad to have firm ground under their feet instead of the shifting sand they had travelled over for so long.[25]

Just how much of Australia the area resembles is open to question, being very dry and still desert-like in appearance as it is. In addition, how she

knows that the horses were ‘glad’ about the changed conditions is something of a mystery! Nevertheless, her point is probably valid.

(© 2016 Microsoft Corporation)

By the time 4 LH Brigade reached Khan Yunus, the forces that had preceded them (including 8 LHR) had already been involved in the First Battle of Gaza (25 March). The Allies were attempting to break the Turks’ heavily fortified Gaza-Beersheba defensive line (about forty-eight kilometres wide). Daley[26] reflects that, given the victories in the Sinai, the prospect of defeat had probably not crossed the minds of the Light Horsemen. At Gaza, the attack was initially a success. However, according to Daley,[27] an unnecessarily convoluted chain of command and abysmal communications between the Light Horse units, the British regular infantry and the artillery doomed the attack to failure. The Light Horse actually reached the centre of the town and the British the top of the mountain overlooking it. Then a panicky order came at sundown to withdraw. The British commanders were unaware of the real situation and decided that caution was the best approach. General Harry Chauvel was disgusted and protested vigorously, but to no avail.

‘Harry’ Chauvel
(www.awm.com.au)

Mistakenly believing that the first attack had actually been a success, the British command planned a second attack on the town, scheduled for 19 April. As Daley puts it, they

> . . . were now in serious denial about the dangers of attempting to take Gaza a second time. The Turks had heavily reinforced the city with new men. They had also built another series of elaborate redoubts across the plain from Beersheba.[28]

4 LH Regiment (a part of 4 LH Brigade) at Khan Yunus (AWM J05999)

'One mile from the enemy. One of our main water supplies. Myself and horse' (marked with crosses) (William Dawe)

William had now caught up with his erstwhile comrades in 8 LHR as they gathered to attack near Atawineh. The troops began advancing at daylight. The Turks resisted, using shrapnel shells and machine guns. The countryside was open and exposed, and the Light Horsemen, advancing on foot, suffered heavy casualties. William and his unit were sent forward at 1.50 pm to close a gap that had developed between 3 and 4 LH Brigades. However, the Turks heavily reinforced their defences and exposed 4 LH Brigade's right flank. Cameron Simpson[29] writes that, despite many heroic deeds and fine efforts, the Light Horsemen were forced to withdraw to a position about 600 yards to the rear or they could have faced wholesale slaughter. One 4 LH Brigade trooper, no doubt reflecting the opinions of his comrades, wrote later that

> The country hereabouts offered no protection whatever and the ground was too hard to dig into with picks and shovels . . . This was the most terrible day of slaughter I have ever seen and to have come through without a scratch is a miracle.[30]

At 6.00 pm, the order for a general withdrawal was sent, the move to begin at 7.45 pm. By 8.30 pm, 4 LH Brigade was holding a defensive line that was then entrenched during the night. By the end of the day, the brigade had suffered fifteen killed and 118 wounded.

All was quiet throughout the night.

'Next day after the Battle of Gaza, men and horses dog tired.' William marked with a cross. (William Dawe)

Like the first battle a month earlier, the second one at Gaza was a very costly failure, causing as many as 25 000 allied casualties (4 LH Brigade lost fifteen killed and 119 wounded). A consequential casualty of a different kind was General Murray. Simpson[31] says that, by this time, the Light Horse had lost all faith in him. The British replaced him with Lieutenant-General Edmund 'Bull' Allenby, a man of far more aggressive intent. Simpson and Daley add that it was only with his timely arrival that the British High Command regained the respect of the Light Horsemen.

Allenby on left (William Dawe)

Allenby took quick action to improve the situation. The force underwent significant expansion, with a new, combined Desert Mounted Corps being created, led by newly promoted Lieutenant-General Sir 'Harry' Chauvel – the first Australian general to command an army corps.

Light Horse machine gun section at drill, 1918 (AWM B00462)

The Gaza-Beersheba fortification was now effectively the front line, and 4 LH Brigade spent the next few days reinforcing its position along it. On 22 April, the brigade withdrew to the rear and established a defensive posture.

A makeshift trench, somewhere in the Middle East (William Dawe)

It was not out of danger, however. On the last day of the month, while at Abasan el Kebir, a returning regiment was fired upon by hostile Bedouins, who wounded one man and killed a horse. Nine Bedouins were captured and one was killed.

A group of Bedouins captured at Romani, September 1916
(AWM J01069)

Australian author Ion Idriess, a member of the Light Horse, wrote in his diary about the Bedouin:

> They snipe our wounded, and dig up our dead, and steal everything they can lay their hands on. But far worse than this they are spies for the Turks, and Turkish and German spies dress up in their clothes . . . and yet we are warned to leave the Bedouins strictly alone. [32]

When Chauvel was promoted to lead the Desert Mounted Corps, his predecessor, British Lieutenant-General Philip Chetwode, became commander of the combined Eastern Force. He immediately began drawing up a blueprint for breaking the Beersheba – Gaza line. The scheme involved deceiving the Turks that a third attack on Gaza was planned when, in fact, the target would be Beersheba. Then, once that town was captured, the Allies planned to use it as a base, from which they would wage a series of battles across the lines of Turkish trenches to Gaza. As always in such dry area, water was the key. As the weather grew hotter, the Light Horsemen and engineers roamed the desert south-east of Beersheba to mark vital (but inadequate) water points. Chetwode's plan was based upon the assumption by the Turks that no forces could go around the defensive line and east of Beersheba because of the lack of water in the Negev Desert. He wanted to prove them wrong.

A British Army bivouac on the Gaza-Beersheba defensive line (AWM H10590)

On 15 May, after various operations at the front line, 4 LH Brigade was ordered to move back to a rest camp at Tel el Marakeb, on the Mediterranean coast. It stayed there until the twentieth, when it was order to go forward, and was based at places such as Tel el Fara, Kazar

and the colourfully named El Buggar, conducting various operations

against the Turks. At the last-mentioned settlement, the men and animals suffered a severe dust storm during the night that delayed their occupation of that part of the line. Such storms were another unwelcome aspect of life in desert areas.

Members of 4 ALH Brigade preparing to bathe their horses and camels at Tel el Marakeb (AWM J00425)

On 24 May, after a number of minor operations on the front line, the force moved back once more to Tel el Marakeb. Some squadrons, having been given roving commissions in the general area, also reported back on the same day. Whether any of the machine gun squadron had accompanied them is not known, but it would be highly likely. The next day, the brigade moved to nearby (and also colourfully named) El Fukhari. The unit commander recorded that

> During the past week at MARAKEB both men and horses benefited by the rest and evacuations among both amongst men and horses showed a considerable decrease.

It was obvious that the desert conditions, poor diets and scarcity of water were reaping their toll upon the combatants, both man and beast.

On 28 May, the brigade moved back to the front line at Tel el Farah and took up the responsibility for 'standing to arms' at night, in case of an enemy attack. None eventuated.

On 2 June, at 2.30 in the morning, an explosion occurred at nearby

Kh Khasif. That evening, an order was issued for a reconnaissance to take place the next day to locate the explosion. A number of Light Horse squadrons plus two sections of the machine gun squadron were duly sent out. It was discovered that a large water cistern had been blown up, but no material damage had been done. The Turks were doing what they could to make the Allies as uncomfortable as possible.

A large explosion in the desert, possibly a heavy calibre shell, a mine or the deliberate destruction of a cistern (William Dawe)

The brigade spent the months of June, July and August alternately at the front in the area Tel el Farah-Tel el Marakeb-El Buggar, and then in reserve at various locations. While at the front, or near to it, the men were occasionally shelled or bombed from aeroplanes and a number of casualties were incurred. More positively, On 14 August, while the brigade was at Marakeb, it was inspected by 'Harry' Chauvel.

On 15 September, while in training at El Fukhari and preparing for a move to Tel el Farah, William was transferred to 2 LH Brigade Machine Gun Squadron. The reasons for this move are unknown. Perhaps it was just an adjustment made to balance up available numbers in all of the brigades' squadrons. William's new brigade was also training and in the same location, so the move was probably little more than a walk or ride to other tents. On 18 September, the unit moved to nearby Kazar to bivouac.

2 LH Brigade colour patch (www.alh-research.tripod.com)

By late October, all was in readiness for the attack at Beersheba. Because of its position, and because the territory to the east of it was undefended and lacked water supplies, the town held the key to the rest of the Middle Eastern campaign. If the Allies were to get past it, they had to capture it and its all-important wells. Failure, according to Daley[33], meant a long march back and almost certain death for some horses, if not men. They **had** to succeed.

Because it was the closest unit to the town, 4 LH Brigade was chosen to make the attack. But for his recent transfer, William would have been with them and thus earned his place in history. The task of 4 LH Brigade, as noted above, was to circumvent the Gaza-Beersheba line at its eastern end, where a sizeable gap in the Turkish defences existed. The gap was there for a reason: water supplies in the area were almost non-existent. The only water was at Beersheba, so that town had to be taken as quickly as possible or those forces would have the choice of retreating or succumbing to thirst. Travelling at night, 4 LH Brigade reached the Beersheba area in the early morning of 31 October, ready for the attack later that day.

The attack began in the early morning, involving artillery and infantry. It did not go to plan, however, and by late afternoon the town had still not been taken. The need for water was paramount (4 LH Brigade's mounts had not had any for almost thirty hours) and the Turks would have the time overnight to either reinforce the town or retreat, blowing up the vital wells before they left. Chauvel decided to attack with horsemen and hopefully surprise the enemy. 4 and 12 Light Horse Regiments – approximately 800 men - were assigned the task. Wielding their drawn bayonets in the manner of cavalry sabres, they were to charge across

almost seven kilometres of what Daley[34] describes as 'open, bare ground, punctuated in parts by the shallow, dry beds of creeks and rivulets.'

And, at 4.30 pm on 31 October, they did it.

4 Light Horse Regiment on the way to Beersheba (AWM A02788)

At a cost of thirty-one deaths and thirty-six wounded, the riders reached the first Turkish trenches, crossed them and then took on the enemy from the rear. Many Turks were caught by surprise and quickly defeated. They had expected the light horsemen to dismount in front of the town and take up firing positions. Large numbers surrendered immediately. Most importantly, nearly all of the wells were saved. Thirty-eight enemy officers and 700 other ranks were captured. Afterwards, a captured German staff officer commented on the Australian troopers:

> **We did not believe that the charge would be pushed home. That seemed an impossible intention. I have heard a great deal of the fighting qualities of the Australian soldiers. They are not soldiers at all; they are madmen.**[35]

The capture of Beersheba (recreated in the feature film *The Light Horsemen*) opened the way first to Gaza, which finally fell to the Allies on 7 November and caused Turkish resistance in southern Palestine to collapse, and then to Jerusalem, which surrendered on 9 December.

However, while those charging horsemen are rightly revered in Australian military history, we must not forget the subsidiary but all-important roles played by other members of the Light Horse, including William. Daley[36] comments that the charge was not altogether unparalleled that day in terms of bravery and determination. The capture of Tel el Saba (the original village of Beersheba) earlier that day by New Zealanders and Australians was an almost textbook example of soldiers scoring a resounding victory against seemingly impossible odds. Had that charge and victory not taken place, Beersheba would not have fallen that day and many more horses and men would have been required to march back to other settlements for water. 2 LH Brigade's role in the capture of Tel el Saba came that morning. Chauvel ordered the brigade to cut the road between Beersheba and Hebron (thus disallowing the Turks from reinforcing their troops at Beersheba) and take a high point - Tel el Sakaty - north-east of the town. Led by 7 LHR, the horsemen rode in under the Turkish artillery. Not one of them was wounded as they careened through a Bedouin camp. Ion Idriess, a member of 2 LH Brigade, remembers sweeping

> . . . among the mud houses of a Bedouin village . . . scattering camels, donkeys and goats . . . Suddenly a Turkish cavalry regiment with four mountain-guns appeared almost in front . . . They stared amazed, then wheeled and galloped back hell for leather . . . they got in behind the Tel el Sakaty redoubt, thrashed their gun-teams up a hill and wheeled around in action just as the 7th and we plunged down into an old wadi-bed [a dry watercourse] facing the action.[37]

Artillery pounded Tel el Sakaty until, about midday, 2 LH Brigade took the mound and cut the Hebron Road. Daley[38] comments that, as the fine red dust settled around the settlement, Idriess and his mates could see the fierce battle for Tel el Saba in the distance.

In the month leading up to the attack on Beersheba, 2 LH Brigade had been having a hard time of it. After training at Kazar between 1 and 20 October, it moved to Esani on the twenty-first. Water was the brigade's big problem, and it appears that it was obliged as a result to move to nearby Asluj. The situation improved a little, but the commander still found it necessary to send the horses of two regiments to Khalasa on 28 October in order to conserve water supplies. They returned the next day and the brigade moved *en masse* to Bir el Hammam, from where it made the attack on Bir es Sakaty on the thirty-first. The commander recorded that the brigade

> . . . made the line at BIR ES Sakaty good under very heavy

shellfire. 5th and 7th Regmnts. attempted to gain heights dominating HEBRON Road but were held up by considerable numbers of enemy with machine guns.[39]

'After a scrap. Just had a good wash and general clean up'.
(William Dawe)

Despite the fact that Beersheba was taken late that day, the Turks in the area continued to fight on. On the first two days of November, 2 LH Brigade was in conflict with units in the Hebron Road area, and it lost a captain on the third. The Turks also trucked in three lots of reinforcements during that day and used their heavy artillery to hold up the Australian advance. Water continued to be a problem. It was difficult to get the horses at least one drink a day from rain water pools in the wadis. Resupply was also a problem. Food and ammunition had to be brought up overnight over particularly rough terrain, made worse by deliberate enemy shelling during the day. 'Friendly' Arabs were suspected of accurately sighting the enemy's guns on the troopers, and the Australians were unable to return any effective fire. 6 LHR, holding the Hebron Road, was in a particularly bad position as it was up against a nest of machine guns and snipers, and was losing men every day.

On 6 November, the brigade was able to move away from the road and back to Beersheba to water. William may well have taken the following photo at that time.

'General view of Beersheba from the Cemetary [*sic*]'
(William Dawe)

By the next day, however, the men were under heavy shellfire again, but fortunately in a better sheltered wadi. They still lost two of their lieutenants. On the positive side, they took a number of prisoners, quite a few guns and some stores on 7 and 8 November. Despite this good news, there was concern because the horses had had no water since Beersheba.

9 November was, in the words of the commander, 'a great day for the Brigade.'[40] Under heavy shelling, and suffering some casualties, the three regiments of the brigade took two settlements, capturing

> *. . . Great quantities of stores waggons* [*sic*] and *materials of all sorts … 7th Regt. took a convoy of about 150 waggons, 350 prisoners and many animals, most of the latter in a wretched condition . . . Very many abandoned waggons on the road and stores being looted by Arabs. In afternoon moved on again and 5th Regt.. supported by a sqdn. of 7th most dashingly rushed another convoy of over 150 waggons and took over 350 prisoners. This convoy subjected to heavy shellfire from evening on friend and foe alike. Squadron of 7th attached to 5th cleverly took 231 more prisoners in the dark. The Turks advanced on this squadron . . .*
> *Their bayonets were fixed and they threw a bomb, but Major Willsallen in charge of the squadron told his men to shout out the Turkish words 'to surrender'. This had the necessary effect and these men were added to those already taken . . . Up to date the*

brigade has taken about 1500 prisoners, 12 guns and about 500 waggons.[41]

'Fourteen hundred Jacko [Turkish] prisoners resting at Duran proceeding to Tel el Jimmy' (William Dawe)

The commander also reported that one squadron and machine guns had been temporarily attached to another unit and had had a hard time, involving severe fighting and many casualties. Whether William was with those machine guns we do not know – but he may have been.

10 November 1917 was the day William's war came to an end – almost a year to the day before the Great War finally finished. The brigade found itself unable to move forward as the enemy held a strong position, and it was more important for the Australians to find water than to attack. While the search was being undertaken, the Turks shelled the Australian positions, causing a number of casualties. It was probably then that William was wounded. His record states that he had a 'GSW" ('gun shot wound') to his thigh. However, the term 'GSW' was used generically to describe any kind of wound, and it is more likely, perhaps, that he was hit by a shell splinter.

William was transferred to 66 Casualty Clearing Station by the Nottingham and Derby Field Ambulance, then to a hospital in El Arish on the fourteenth and further to one in Kantara on the fifteenth. Given the number of moves involved, the wound was obviously serious. On 17 November, he was transferred to 14 Australian General Hospital at Abbassia. By the twenty-first he was reported as being 'dangerously ill'.

14 Australian Field Hospital (AWM B02445)

William was obviously a fighter, and he had perhaps the greatest battle of his war in front of him. It took ten days, but he was finally reported to be 'improving' on 2 December and then 'out of danger' on the third. Whether he was up to receiving a Christmas box on foot is unknown:

14 Australian Hospital, Christmas 1917 (AWM B02436)

If not, he surely would have enjoyed celebrations in the ward:

Christmas decorations in E Ward, 1917. Decorative competitions were held for convalescing patients and prizes were awarded. Behind the beds in the background tables are set up, probably for Christmas dinner. (AWM B02435)

During December, a medical board decided that, given the seriousness of his wound, William would be repatriated to Australia early the next year for a period of six months. Accordingly, he was scheduled to embark on A38 HMAT *Ulysses* from Port Said on 15 February.

Ambulances ready to take patients from 14 Australian Hospital to a hospital ship, 1917. (AWM B02437)

HMAT *Ulysses* (AWM PS0154)

William's comrades in the Light Horse fought on in his absence. Gaza finally fell to the Allies on 7 November and caused Turkish resistance in southern Palestine to collapse. Jerusalem surrendered on 9 December. Then it was on to Damascus. The campaign took the Light Horse into the Jordan Valley in 1918, and then along the coast of Palestine to just south of Tel Aviv in mid-September. On 1 October, a patrol of 4 Light Horse Regiment was the first to enter Damascus. Four weeks later, while the regiment was on its way to town of Homs as part of the next stage of the advance, the Turks surrendered. Their war was over.

Australian Light Horse monument, Beersheba (en.wikipedia.org)

William arrived back in Australia on 18 March. He may have spent some time in Heidelberg Repatriation Hospital, still recovering from his wound. Other than that he would have been based at an army depot. We know from his record that he went absent without leave for a day from Macleod on 20 June, so he must have been ambulatory by that time. He was sentenced to lose one day's pay in consequence. By June, and with the war going in the Allies' favour, the army obviously decided not to send William back to the Middle East. The conflict finally ended on 11 November.

William was eventually discharged from the AIF on 12 September 1918. He may have gone back to his pre-war position as a groom. If he did so, it was not too long, however, before he took on a profession with a greater future, given the eclipse of horse-powered forms of transport by technological advances brought about by the war. When he re-enlisted at the outbreak of the Second World War in October 1939, at the age of fifty, he stated his occupation as 'painter'. By that time he was married to Olive Mason, had a family and lived in Mordialloc.

A family photo early in the second war. William is on the right at The rear. (Sally Dunn/Michael Dawe)

William joined a training battalion and was sent to Bendigo in September 1940. Four months later, however, he was evacuated to the repatriation hospital at Caulfield and spent more than nine months there. He did return to his unit, but his health problem was obviously too great and he was discharged from Royal Park on 22 January 1942. On his discharge papers he declared that he claimed or revealed a disability caused or aggravated by war service. It was also noted that he was suffering from diabetes. These facts were confirmed by a medical board.

William lived for another sixteen years, dying in 1958 at the Heidelberg Repatriation Hospital at the age of sixty-nine.

Rest in peace, William. You fought bravely and served your country well. You paid a considerable price as a result.

POSTSCRIPT

In the 1960s, William's widow, Olive, wrote to the military authorities. She claimed that her husband had died as a result of his war injury and requested an 'Anzac Medal' on his behalf. The claim was rejected. She was probably asking for a Commonwealth Gallipoli Star, an award proposed by Anzac commander-in-chief, Sir William Birdwood, and approved by King George V. However, such an award was opposed by British parliamentarians and the media because it would only be awarded to Australian and New Zealand veterans, and not the British troops who were there as well. The award was cancelled as a result in 1918, but ribbons were sent to Australian and New Zealand Gallipoli veterans. It was decided then to award the 1914-15 Star to eligible soldiers. The Australian Military pointed out to Olive that William had received one of those at the end of the First World War.

Some 'Gallipoli Stars' were privately made in 1990 to present to surviving Anzac veterans.


AUSTRALIAN COMMONWEALTH
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Endnotes

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[4] *The Australian Light Horse,* Sydney, Hachette Australia, 2009, pp. 130-1
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[6] Perry, op. cit., p. 138
[7] Op. cit., pp.79-80
[8] *Bad characters,* Sydney, Murdoch Books Australia, 2010, p. 180
[9] *Beersheba: a journey through Australia's forgotten war,* Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 2009, p. 35
[10] Op. cit., p. 139
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[13] Op. cit., p. 71
[14] www.awm.gov.au
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[18] Op. cit., p. 140
[19] Quoted in Stone, op. cit., p.141
[20] Ibid.
[21] Corporal Roy Dunk, quoted ibid.
[22] Op. cit., pp. 119-120
[23] Op. cit., p. 19
[24] Op. cit., p. 128
[25] Op. cit., p. 19
[26] Op. cit., p. 75
[27] Ibid., p. 80
[28] Ibid., p. 84
[29] *Maygar's boys*, Moorooduc, Just Soldier, Military Research and Publications, 1997, p. 13
[30] Pauls, Ernest, quoted in Daley, op. cit., p. 85
[31] Op. cit., p. 13
[32] Quoted in ibid., p. 86
[33] Op. cit., p. 2
[34] Ibid., p. 101
[35] quoted in Perry, op. cit., p. 318
[36] Op. cit., p. 101
[37] Quoted in op. cit., p. 102
[38] Ibid.
[39] 2 Light Horse Brigade War Diary, 31October 1917
[40] Ibid., 9 November 1917
[41] Ibid.