Australians at War Film Archive

George Hulse - Transcript of interview

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Tape 1

NB. This transcript is of an interview filmed for the television series, Australians at War in 1999-2000. It was incorporated into the Archive in 2008.

18:34 Well in my troop I commanded the 1st Field Troop of the 1st Field Squadron. We had about fifty percent national servicemen and fifty percent regulars. From my point of view I really couldn't discern the difference between my regular soldiers and my national service soldiers because firstly all their training was the same, their recruit training and their employment training in the corps of engineers was identical and the only thing that I could probably go on was an attitudinal

19:00 basis that might have made the difference between a regular soldier and a national serviceman but even that wasn't discernible because the attitude of my national service soldiers was excellent. It was equal to the regular army soldiers and you couldn't tell them apart. So I was absolutely delighted with the National Service Scheme we had at that time in respect of producing soldiers ready to go to war such as we faced in Vietnam.

You would have heard a lot about protests at home

19:30 **and the resistance and everything else, just come in from a different angle, and say that cause we're not using any of my questions, that you heard a lot about a lot of the protests and the feeling back home, but certainly because you later on in there, the type of people you got, threw themselves into, you know the conscripts in a sense, you know I'm not putting words into your mouth, but coming in from that point of view that they didn't, you know they threw their heart and soul into it, is basically. So maybe start off with I know there were, you know there were**

20:00 **protests and Moratorium marches were about to begin, that you'd heard about that, in your own words?**

Well one of the things that really upset us somewhat there, while we were trying to fight a war in Vietnam, was reading in the paper each and practically every day that we had Moratorium marches on back in Australia telling us that we were out there killing the women and the children and doing some awful things, none of which were true. I certainly didn't see any of that and I knew that a lot of my national servicemen

20:30 who had no choice but to come into the army were facing that while they were going through their recruit training, while they were doing their initial employment training, being put on ships and sent to Vietnam, and aircraft of course, being sent to Vietnam. And I felt sorry for these young men that they should face all this pressure back home and then come into the very cauldron that was going to cause them all that sort of derision while they were there and their attitudes again were fantastic. When they arrived in

21:00 the 1st Field Squadron they realised there was a job to be done, that most of the stuff that they had heard and read about was a load of nonsense and that the job that was, that they had been sent to do was worthwhile. Of course then there was the going home and this was a tough call again because having had that experience in Vietnam and some of them went home wounded, some of them went home shockingly wounded, they would go home and find all this pressure on yet again about their involvement in that war, that dirty, unpopular

21:30 war. So I felt very sorry for my national servicemen in particular. But again they never once let me down, not ever.

Talk about how different it was, but directly your involvement in engineers and what they did.

Well, in my job at fire support base Coral and Balmoral

22:00 part of the role of the corps of engineers is to provide field fortifications so we did a lot of digging, we had our bulldozers with us. We put out barbed wire. We dug many emplacements for things like our

radar machines. We [UNCLEAR] for our artillery. We made some roads. We made helicopter landing zones. We tried to find water, that was a bit of a problem when we first arrived. We finally got that squared away and we put in two minefields

22:30 at fire support base Balmoral at which I was the site officer. I was in charge of that and I had a magnificent sergeant, a huge man who actually showed me the ropes on how to go about laying a minefield, Sergeant Phil Jones, who I'd never met before I arrived in Balmoral. I was told by his troop commander, in those days Captain Viv Morgan, that this man had been to Malaya and Borneo and had been in Vietnam and he had a lot of experience and here I was a lieutenant fairly green into the country

23:00 and being told to and take this sergeant, be in charge of him and all his soldiers and put these minefields in. So when I got out of the chopper at Balmoral, I had flown from Coral to Balmoral to put this minefield in, I saw this huge man at the other end of the helicopter landing zone and I walked up to him and I said, "Well, I'm Lieutenant George Hulse, you must be Sergeant Jones?" He said, "Yes Sir, I am." I said, "Well, I'm in charge of this operation, what is it that you want me to do?" and at that he put a big smile on his face, put an arm around my shoulder and said, "Come over here skipper, I'll just

23:30 have a yarn to you." And the moment he stopped calling me 'Sir' and started calling me 'skipper', I knew that he was on my side. So I learned a lot from Phil Jones and we put that, those minefields in and they were very useful at Balmoral especially when the frontal attacks came and hit our 3rd Battalion Royal Australian Regiment. So that was another role of the corps of engineers.

Just talk about laying the minefields… what a difficult task

24:00 **it was. Cause we're talking about Dat Do and the barrier minefield and how it was used, and in fact was ultimately quite lethal. So wrap that up, I know you weren't there at the time but you know, you've done it…**

Well, initially in the 1st Field Squadron we were a bit nervous about the necessity to put a minefield in.

24:30 We'd already had a very bitter experience with the barrier minefield at Dat Do and The Horseshoe area in Phuoc Tuy Province and we were against putting that minefield in, in the first place. Now we were asked to put in a second minefield. So this time we decided that because it was going to be protected by Australian infantry, that is that the, our infantry would have full observation and full fire power over the, both these minefields. We were a bit more relaxed about that. The other

25:00 element of these two minefields we put into Balmoral was that they had limited life, unlike the huge barrier minefield that was put in, in Phuoc Tuy Province, these minefields that we were putting in would be destroyed probably on the day that we left, if they hadn't already been destroyed by enemy attacks. So we were a bit more relaxed about the minefields that we put in at Balmoral compared to that huge minefield from which we suffered so greatly, that we'd put into Phuoc Tuy Province.

25:30 One of the problems we found with that barrier minefield was that the Viet Cong were in there taking the mines out, they managed to defuse quite a few of them and then of course we would find them under our soldiers in Phuoc Tuy Province and my troop, in fact the whole squadron found those M16 mines practically every other day when we went on patrols. Quite often our infantry would refuse to go into areas without taking combat engineer mini teams to help them through. In other places we

26:00 had, a mini team incidentally is just two sappers and a combat team is six sappers with a corporal and so quite often if there was a large incidence of mines and booby traps then a combat team would go in, six sappers and a corporal to help our infantry and our armoured corps go through areas to protect them against the general run of mines that were brought in by the enemy.

Can I just get you to, we don't know what sapper is, it's a word that I…?

26:30 One of the features of the barrier minefield was that it was, the intent of it was to stop the Viet Cong moving across Phuoc Tuy Province from the east so that they wouldn't be able to penetrate into the Long Hai Hills and then be able to have that area to ambush Australian patrols and convoys and so forth coming between Vung Tau and Nui Dat. It was intended I believe, only to be a barrier minefield for a short period of time, perhaps three or six months. The problem was that

27:00 the mines that were being laid had a life of type of maybe fifteen or twenty years perhaps even longer so it was then absolutely imperative that every one of those mines be covered by fire and observation and one of the problems that you have is that you kno, in the middle of the night in the pouring rain you can't see what's going on in that minefield and if the enemy want to breach that minefield, and that's also a job of the corps of engineers, that that's the time you'd do it and that's how we lost

27:30 most of our mines, was when we couldn't cover that minefield from fire and observation. I might say that the sappers and incidentally a sapper is the same rank as a private so if you have an infantry private, we call our engineer privates sappers, and it's a traditional rank that's come back many, many years when we used to sap underneath fortifications and collapse castles. So they dug a sap underneath and that's where we got the name sappers, sappers and miners. So we still wear the

28:00 name sapper. And I would call myself a sapper officer just to make things more complicated, and we come from the corps of sappers, so you can be a brigadier and still be a sapper or you can be a sapper, a basic fellow that's right out there finding the mines and still be the same rank. So when I talk about my

sappers I'm talking about the engineer private. One of the problems that we have when we were laying minefields of course is that everything has got to be very well organised. Every last mine is accounted

28:30 for, it's counted and it's put on a minefield record so that in theory you can go back and get it again later and just pick it up and put it back in its box. That's the theory. In practice that just, it's just impossible to do it because one of the things that the enemy sappers will do to us and we will do to them is get into a minefield and move the mines around so that what they thought was safe areas now has their mines in it and that happened to us in the barrier minefield also. We found that our mines were not only being shifted

29:00 around in the barrier minefield but being laid outside the barrier minefield so when our patrols would go along clearing the outside of the wire of the minefield they'd tread on the mines. So that barrier minefield really cost us, not only a lot in terms of casualties and time and resources and the money to put it in and the money to look after it but when we were leaving Vietnam in the early 70s then we had to go through extraordinary measures to get rid of those mines so that they wouldn't be there to this very day.

29:30 So that barrier minefield, in my opinion was a mistake and it only had a limited time when it was, if you like successful but from there on out it created tremendous problems for us and it's something in the corps of engineers we're not going to forget for a long time. Certainly I'll never forget that, the lessons we learnt from that minefield.

Tell me about how, how do you spot, you're wandering along, how do you possibly spot a

30:00 **mine? Take me through that in some detail.**

Of course, finding the mines is the tough part, especially when you're in the jungle or you're trying to patrol down a road or you're in support of armoured vehicles. One of the problems we've got is that the enemy will come along at night time, put in a minefield; sometimes it's a five hundred pound bomb and camouflage it so that when a vehicle drives

30:30 over it of course it fires. Now one of the things that we would do would be to put two sappers out the front and they would have a mine detector and this mine detector really is a misnomer. The mine detector actually finds metal. It's like a resonance machine that sends a ping down into the ground and it comes back to the sapper's earphones and if it detects metal it gives this ping into the sapper's ears and then if he gets that ping he takes his bayonet

31:00 out, or his prodder, and digs it down into the ground very gingerly so that he doesn't set the mine off that he's trying to find and then comes up with the mine. Easier said than done. Not quite that easy because in Vietnam with all the spent bullets and the shrapnel over the years there was metal everywhere. So we didn't treat any ping as being anything else but a mine and so we dug up lots of shrapnel, lots of bullets but quite often we'd dig up mines as well. Quite often many of the

31:30 mines were wrapped in plastic and the only thing you had to go on was the detonator, just a little sliver of metal to find. So there were a few things that told us we had mines out in front of us. One was when the camouflage would decay, that the enemy had put on the mine because he'd dug it at night time he couldn't see the effect during the day and we'd come up during the day and see the mines, what we see what had been dug and then go in after them. In other areas where there were very high mine incidents we'd bring out our mine detectors

32:00 and our prodders and just prod the whole way until we found our mines and when we found the mines of course then we'd have to deal with them. Either you lifted them, and we had a few sappers killed actually trying to defuse the booby traps that were attached to those mines and some of the mines actually fired while they were being defused. And other times we'd put a pulling hook on, get some distance away and pull them out of the ground so we could see what was going on. But that wasn't the end of it either because sometimes we'd pull the mine out of the ground and then when we went to

32:30 investigate the hole out of which this mine had come there was another mine underneath it. So you would think that you were safe putting your foot in the hole out of which a mine had been taken but in fact there was another one underneath it. And quite often the enemy would set booby traps to actually attack the sappers so that they knew if we had pretty good guys out there defusing booby traps they'd set up what's called a double bluff and try and catch us defusing one mine and the other one would go off, off the side of

33:00 the track and get us that way. So you really couldn't relax for a second. You really had to be switched on to what you were doing and the frightening part of that was you were out in front of the infantry, the only people out in front of the sappers were the enemy, either the North Vietnamese or the Viet Cong and we needed our infantry and our armoured corps behind us and our artillery to protect us because our total focus was down on the ground and in the hands of our prodders. And the infantry never let us down with that and we operated with both Australian and New Zealand Infantry

33:30 and in fact there was an amusing difference between the protection from the New Zealand infantry for the sappers in mines, you know they were chasing…

Tape 2

00:44 I learned quite a few lessons particularly out of fire support bases Coral and Balmoral. Part of those was that when you're siting weapon pits,if you don't site them so that they can take a tremendous amount of fire power from enemy artillery you're looking for big trouble,

01:00 and one of the problems that we had up until that point in time was that we had fought counter revolutionary warfare right up until Coral where we were chasing small bands of Viet Cong. Apart from one major battle that we'd had in Long Tan,it was mainly counter revolutionary warfare. Now we had to swing from counter revolutionary warfare to general warfare where we had tanks, we had armoured personnel carriers, we had artillery batteries, there were artillery duels. We had

01:30 large attacks, shoulder to shoulder attacks on our perimeter. We had standing patrols. We had all the gamut of normal general warfare that you'd find, much as you would see in the Second World War, now happening in Vietnam, and this was a total change from the type of warfare which we'd fought up until that point in time. So now we were into the advance, the contact, the attack off the line of advance, the sort of stuff that you had learnt in Australia for the defence of Australia was now in full swing in Vietnam

02:00 and that meant that the corps of engineers had to be pretty well everywhere to make sure that our mobility was fine, so that the mines wouldn't hold us up, so that we had roads, that we had water, we had helicopter landing points. At night time we then fought as infantry. So we didn't get a lot of sleep and the work was always upon us. There were never enough of us in the field squadron to handle all the work that we had so we just simply had to put our heads down and work as hard as we possibly could. Sleep wasn't an option. We just simply had to

02:30 go for it. But it was a style of warfare. It had changed completely and as a result of that some of the lessons I learnt was that in the resource planning and the allocation of priorities and the getting of the resources in the putting troops to task that if you don't have enough people there are certain jobs you can't do and in the corps of engineers we like to think that we're the yes men, no matter what it is we can do it. From that particular operation I learnt there was quite a few times when we should have said no, we can't do

03:00 it, we need more of us, and instead of that we just tried to do the lot. The event was that we ended up with some very tired soldiers and we were very glad to see the end of that operation I can assure you.

Just talking about your admiration for the artillery and the role and not talk much about artillery but they played an important part in Long Tan, so it's almost an extension, in the same way that you're making it pretty concise too, is lovely.

03:30 **It really is.**

The role of the artillery really impressed me. Up until then I saw the artillery as being nine mile snipers. You know, they get right back and fire their shells, always very important people but at Coral that all changed. At Coral they took full frontal attacks. They had North Vietnamese regular soldiers, these were not the Viet Cong part timers, these were regular North Vietnamese soldiers hitting us, had overrun us, had wanted to take the guns out, had already taken out our mortars out

04:00 of the 1st Battalion and were now after the guns and the gunners stuck to those guns. They fired over open sights; they fired these beehive rounds which are a terrible round. What a beehive round is, it's like having hundreds and hundreds of nails about one and a half inches long and instead of them having a head upon which you might hammer with a hammer into a piece of timber they've got a flight like a dart so when they fire they fly off in all different directions and they literally nail you. They literally nail you

04:30 and so the artillery men when their gun position was under full frontal attack by the North Vietnamese in overwhelming numbers, this is shoulder to shoulder attack on the guns, those gunners stuck to their guns and they fired these beehive rounds one after another straight into the face of the enemy. Now had they not done that we would have lost those guns. Had we lost those guns I feel that I wouldn't be here talking to you today so I owe the artillery a great vote of gratitude for that. On top of that not only

05:00 were they fighting for their very lives and fighting for their guns but every now and again they'd be requested to send a fire mission in support of our infantry, our armour and our tanks and they would still fire those fire missions. So they were still in support of the rest of the army while they themselves were under dire consequences for their own survival. So the artillery in my opinion came out of that shining as true knights. They really saved us and of course they

05:30 saved themselves. I wasn't a real proponent of tanks at first but my attitudes changed. When I was told the tanks were coming, these are our Australian Centurion tanks, heavy tank versus tank type vehicle with an eighty millimetre gun on board. When we were told they were coming to Coral I just shook my head and thought

06:00 with all the mud that's around here and with the North Vietnamese regulars, with their RPG7s which is an anti tank grenade, it's fired off a tube. A very good weapon and we certainly had enough fired

against us to respect them and I thought, with enough of those around these tanks just aren't going to last. They're a huge machine. They're going to be an easy target. They're going to be a sitting duck and they're going to bog and we're going to spend all our time either de-bogging them or protecting them. I couldn't

06:30 have been more wrong. When those tanks arrived (a) I never saw one get bogged for a starter, they just churn through the mud anyway, and the second thing was that their protection was so good and their fire power was so devastating that the North Vietnamese learnt very early not to take on a Centurion tank and indeed after a couple of weeks of the Centurion tanks being in that operation I started to think well, in future operations such as this, I don't think we should leave without them. And

07:00 so I turned from being a person who was a bit sceptical about tanks to being very much a proponent of their use in that sort of warfare. I became very much a tank fan after the fire support base Coral and Balmoral.

Talk to me about tunnels. I mean this is a totally different, and I know the last thing I spoke to you about was tunnels

07:30 **before I left.**

Tunnels were a feature of Vietnam and they were pretty much everywhere. One of the jobs of my corps was that once the infantry had secured an enemy position it was generally, might have had a couple of hundred bunkers in it and underneath those bunkers were generally a very sophisticated tunnel system. Sometimes near the villages there'd be a very sophisticated

08:00 tunnel system and some of these tunnel system went for thousands of metres. They started off as a very small spider hole, just big enough for a person my size to get down and then underneath the ground would be developed out into chambers and they'd have wells there, they had hospitals, they had communication centres. It was all underneath the ground and sometimes very deep. The tunnels also came in various tiers so you might go down a tunnel that's only six feet from the surface of the ground but then you'd find a trapdoor which would take you down another

08:30 six feet another trapdoor take you down another six feet and some of these were criss-crossed and at right angles to each other so they went all over the place. It reminds me of the London Underground railway system and you could almost say that the Vietnamese took a picture out of that and painted it in Vietnam. But the problem is that when you get down into a tunnel it's extremely dark and you must have a very good torch and for sappers we really needed three hands. We need one for our

09:00 torch, one for our prodder, because the place was loaded with booby traps and trapdoors and one for our pistol in case we ran up against one of these fellows coming the other way. So we had a little drill going where you'd put the torch down, you'd prod with the prodder and, with one hand and the pistol in the other and then you'd move forward push your torch forward, have a good look to make sure that there's no-one coming the other way, and keep going. Now although that sounds as if it was a terrible sort of situation, sometimes you could relax and sometimes you most

09:30 certainly couldn't. The times when you could not relax is on first entering the tunnels, you knew whether you had what we called a hot hole or a cold hole. A hot hole meant that you knew that the opposition was down there, that someone was at home and you were going to find them or they were going to come and find you. And that was generally obvious from little spiders that lived on the side of the tunnels. If you shone your torch down there and you got hundreds of little eyes beaming back at you of these little spiders

10:00 and the webs were unbroken, that was a cold hole, pretty much a cold hole, so you could relax into that a bit. If however the spiders didn't come and look at you and there were scrapes on the side of the hole and the cobwebs were broken you had a hot hole, and sometimes you could smell the presence of other human beings down the tunnel. Now you really took your time and you pressed on into that with extreme care. What we found difficult in the hot holes was

10:30 when we'd come to a trapdoor and we had to go down through that trapdoor. We'd put a pulling hook on the trapdoor, we'd pull it open and then we had to be very careful how we got onto the next level because if you put your head down and there was an enemy soldier down there he would pike you through the throat with a steel pike and the length of that pike was longer than the trapdoor. So if you got piked you couldn't pull your head back up again. If you went feet first he'd pike you through the stomach so you couldn't get back up again. So

11:00 you know, you really had to be very careful how you went down through the trapdoors, and the way that we did it was to just throw our torch down there first, if there was no reaction of the torch and the torch was tied to us on a piece of string we'd swing the torch around and listen very intently and if there was nothing there then we'd put our head down very quickly and take a look and pull it back up again very quickly if we saw something. Most times we didn't see anybody down there and so we would continue on with our search. But wherever we could we would have communication

11:30 back to our people on the ground so that they could work out roughly with compass bearings and pacing where we were under the ground in case we got into trouble down there. But it was worthwhile doing it because we found tape recorders. We found radios. We found ammunition, medical stores, the

whole logistic train of the North Vietnamese Army was under the ground and quite often we'd pull out a lot of this stuff and find out where it was coming from and we'd know a lot about our enemy just by looking at these logistic stores. So

12:00 it was well worth going down those tunnels. We would then try and destroy as much as we could using high explosive but quite often of course that wasn't successful because the array of tunnels was so large that you'd never find enough explosive to be able to do the job so we might just blow up the bunkers and we might blow up the tunnel entrances but we certainly couldn't demolish the entire tunnel system, it was just too extensive.

Talk to me

12:30 **about, you know how you were talking about the spikes…**

Vietnam produced for us tremendous on the job training and I say that euphemistically, because the tunnels were probably the biggest lesson we learnt. We weren't really prepared when we first arrived over there for searching and destroying extensive tunnel systems and the 3rd Field Troop which was commanded by Alex McGregor found quite a few

13:00 tunnels in its area so we started learning pretty early in the piece about some of the problems with tunnels. But as we discovered more and more tunnels and as time went by we found that there was an ever increasing danger as the Viet Cong would find that we were defeating their tunnel system so they would build in more sophisticated traps, more sophisticated corners. Their defence of the tunnels was then becoming an art form rather than just

13:30 dive underneath the ground to get away from us. Now that they knew we were going to go down actively and chase them out of there they were now starting to defend underground. And things like air pockets and air traps where we lost our first sapper under the ground, Corporal Bobby Bowtell actually asphyxiated under the ground, went down too far, no oxygen and he passed away down under the ground. We then had the problem of trying to recover his body in that the hole was too small to allow

14:00 a couple of people to try and pick him up. That was the first lesson we learnt as the corps of sappers, and by the time I arrived there those lessons were being passed down but we still didn't have the answers, because when we went down our tunnels we found that when we had casualties down tunnels, we had the same problems. So while we knew of the problem we still didn't have the answer and every day was a new day. So we took that risk every time we went down those tunnels that we might re-learn the old lessons and that came

14:30 about because before we went to Vietnam we weren't aware of the extensiveness of these tunnels or what we might find down there. So quite often in tunnels that I personally went down sometimes we'd actually hear the enemy moving round in the galleries to each side of us. Couldn't see them but could hear them, no doubt they could hear us so we would just lie very quietly and listen and that was an experience too because you'd switched your light off and the inky blackness can't

15:00 be described, of a tunnel, especially when you can hear other human beings around you whom if you were going to meet you were going to fight to the death in this inky blackness. So at times it became a question as to whether you left the torch off or you switched it on. It was a question whether you took the safety catch off your pistol or left it on for safety measures and this was on the job training. This is how it happened when you were down there and you just simply had to make up your mind what you did at that very second in time. There was no training for it. There was no preparation for

15:30 it. You just did it as you saw it and every second that passed was another second that you were surviving and, until you got out of there or until you found what you were after or until the enemy disappeared from there. But it was a very, very nervous time at times when you knew there was someone else down there in that tunnel system. You couldn't see them. You could hear them and at times you could actually smell them and you knew they could hear you and smell you and knew you were coming down for them. And so the tunnels held a particularly

16:00 special part in the sappers' sort of psyche that it was worth going down there for the benefit of the intelligence community but it was hard fought intelligence and required a lot of courage on behalf of the sappers who went down there.

Talk about with the pike, talk about the dangers that you would come across and pretend just that you haven't said anything about the pike, booby traps.

One of the features of the tunnels was that the

16:30 Viet Cong that were down there, sometimes they had caretakers and sometimes they had regular soldiers down the tunnels. They weren't about to give us their tunnels without a fight. They knew they had to fight to keep us out of there. They knew they had to fight to unnerve us so we wouldn't go down into those tunnels so they had a number of strategies to dissuade us from going any further in their tunnels. One of them was to make sure that if we tried to go from one gallery level to the next that as we opened the trapdoor

17:00 and put our head down there they would take out a spike, say a metal shaft with a pointed end and we'd call that a pike, and they'd thrust that or attempt to thrust that through your throat if you put your head down first. So that with the length of the pike being bigger than the diameter of the trapdoor if you got

piked you couldn't pull your head back up and your mate couldn't pull you out again because you were trapped and you were at the mercy of the guy at the next level. The same thing if you decided not to

17:30 put your head down, if you went down feet first he'd do the same through your stomach. So you were really caught if you went down there and there was an enemy soldier in the next gallery. So we devised a method by which we put our torch down there first and swung the torch around a few times and listened very intently for the sound of breathing or for the smell of another human being down there and if we figured that there was no-one down there we very quickly put our head around the corner or down that next

18:00 gallery for a quick look. So we learnt again on the job training. There were no books written about this. There was no how to do this. You just simply had the problem in front you, you confronted it, you got on with it and again most of our casualties down the tunnels in the corps of engineers were through coming across the booby traps. Some of the booby traps might even be a living snake where you prod down and hit a trapdoor and from the ceiling

18:30 would come a very venomous snake. Again this was something that had nothing to do with meeting an enemy soldier but was just as vicious and nasty anyway. Sometimes you'd do something by accident like dislodge a group of ants who would then, you know become very angry and want to do things to you to get rid of you out of their tunnel as it were. So these were ongoing problems. The other thing was that if you were down there for some period of time because the holes, in some cases

19:00 were so small you could only take with you your combat equipment and some water but if you were down there for a long time and you started getting hungry well that was bad luck. You just had with you what you had with you and you just continued on with it. So again the tunnels were very unnerving. They took a lot of energy. You came out filthy from the tunnels. You came out having pumped a lot of adrenaline, but you also came out with a lot of intelligence information.

INTERVIEW ENDS